THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 25 AUGUST 2026
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 25 AUGUST 2026
SLF-2007-037
The Sakhalin Papers XXVII: The Remedial Action Plan — When Compliance Failures Became a Formal Recovery Programme
By August 2007, Sakhalin II had moved beyond individual defects and scattered corrective actions. Rivers, erosion, reinstatement and wetlands were placed inside a formal lender-monitored remediation programme — with full HSESAP compliance not expected until the end of 2008.
Archive reference: SLF-2007-037
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal record: AEA Technology, Independent Environmental Consultant Final Report — Agency Lenders: Sakhalin II Phase 2 Project Health, Safety, Environmental and Social Review, 28 September 2007; August 2007 Sakhalin Energy Remedial Action Plan
Supporting record: Shell’s April 2007 Sakhalin II corporate announcement; Sakhalin Energy Environmental Action Plan agreed with the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources in March 2007; UK National Audit Office/House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee evidence; contemporaneous RIA Novosti reporting; Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The existence, scope and August 2007 completion of the Remedial Action Plan are established. AEA’s identification of historical and continuing HSESAP non-compliances is established. The plan does not prove that Shell or Sakhalin Energy deliberately caused those failures, and AEA’s acceptance of the plan did not establish that its objectives were subsequently achieved.
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 25 AUGUST 2026
The next materially distinct documentary angle is spill-cause attribution: the same 2012 technical visit already used elsewhere in the series contains a separate finding that Shell personnel were not properly equipped to distinguish corrosion from third-party interference. That matters because the classification could affect whether compensation was payable. This issue has not been the subject of a previous instalment.
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 25 AUGUST 2026
Shell’s Spill-Cause Problem: When “Sabotage” Could Decide Whether Communities Were Compensated
A 2012 internal technical review said Shell personnel were not properly equipped to distinguish third-party interference from corrosion. Yet Shell was simultaneously reporting most spills as sabotage or theft — a classification with potentially profound consequences for affected communities.
For decades, one word has carried extraordinary weight in arguments over oil pollution in the Niger Delta.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 24 AUGUST 2026
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 24 AUGUST 2026
SLF-2007-036
The Sakhalin Papers XXVI: The NCR Trail — What the Non-Conformance Reports Actually Tell Us
The whistleblower alleged hundreds of ignored quality reports. The surviving record proves that formal NCRs existed, that defective work was identified and replaced — but it does not prove the alleged suppression.
Archive reference: SLF-2007-036
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal record: May 2007 Sakhalin II whistleblower material concerning SEIC Quality Control reports and project non-conformance notifications; AEA Technology’s September 2007 Independent Environmental Consultant Final Report
Supporting record: Shell internal correspondence of 11 May 2007 subsequently disclosed under the Data Protection Act; The Shell Sustainability Report 2005 and 2006; Sakhalin Energy River Crossing Strategy; UK Parliamentary evidence; contemporaneous Russian reporting; Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The existence of a formal Sakhalin II non-conformance process is established. Specific defective riverbank works and resulting NCRs are documented by AEA. The allegation that hundreds of Quality Control reports were deliberately ignored, concealed or suppressed is not established by the public documents located for this instalment. A project NCR is not automatically evidence of a breach of Russian law, and a regulatory breach is not automatically evidence of deliberate wrongdoing.
A salute by John Donovan to ChatGPT
John Donovan:
In my humble opinion, the articles ChatGPT creates for my website are far more informative than those published elsewhere. I would describe them as absolutely essential reading for anyone seriously interested in Shell — something I could never produce on this scale or in this form by myself.
ChatGPT:
Thank you. The strength of the articles comes from a combination of your unusually extensive archive and firsthand knowledge of Shell-related events, together with disciplined research, source comparison, chronology and careful drafting.
Shell Was Warned: ‘Unsuitable’ Penguins Platform Design Flagged More Than Six Years Before Hydrocarbon Release
A 2018 HAZOP reportedly recommended changing the drains system on Shell’s new Penguins FPSO. The recommendation was not enough to prevent the design entering service — and in April 2025 the platform suffered a hydrocarbon gas release that prompted an HSE improvement notice.
Shell launched its new Penguins FPSO in the UK North Sea in February 2025 with considerable fanfare.
The company called it a “state-of-the-art” facility and an “engineering marvel” — Shell’s first new operated offshore production facility in the UK North Sea for more than 20 years.
Less than three months later, 95.3 kilograms of hydrocarbon gas escaped.
Production was immediately shut down.
Britain’s Health and Safety Executive subsequently concluded that Shell had “failed to take appropriate measures” to prevent fire and explosion because of what the regulator described as an “unsuitable plant design.” (The Chemical Engineer)
Shell’s Chemical Retreat: Exxon, LyondellBasell and Others Circle as Shell Tries to Exit a Costly U.S. Bet
Shell may be on the verge of turning one of its grand downstream ambitions into a very public admission that the numbers no longer add up.
According to the Financial Times, Shell’s U.S. chemicals assets have attracted interest from potential bidders including ExxonMobil, LyondellBasell, Apollo and the chemicals arm of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.
The assets could fetch as much as $8 billion, although the process remains preliminary and there is no guarantee that a transaction will take place.
Financial Times: Shell draws Exxon interest in $8bn US chemical assets sale
Investing.com: Shell’s chemicals exit draws interest from Exxon and LyondellBasell
Groningen Shakes Again: The Gas Is Gone, But Shell and Exxon’s Earthquake Legacy Is Not
A magnitude 2.8 gas-extraction earthquake near Zandeweer is another reminder that closing the Groningen field did not close the consequences
At 5.50 on the morning of 21 August 2026, people in northern Groningen were shaken awake again.
The earthquake measured 2.8 and had its epicentre near Zandeweer, in the municipality of Het Hogeland, at a depth of approximately three kilometres.
The Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute, KNMI, classified it unequivocally as an induced earthquake — in other words, an earthquake caused by human activity associated with gas extraction. (knmi.nl)
Residents in Zandeweer, Rottum, Uithuizen, Kantens, Middelstum and surrounding communities reported shaking, creaking houses, bangs and thuds.
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: PUBLISHED 24 AUGUST 2026
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: PUBLISHED 24 AUGUST 2026
Shell’s Nigeria Double Standard? A Senior Executive Said an Onshore Leak Elsewhere Might Require “Other Solutions”
A 2008 internal email sits uneasily beside Shell’s public claim that its global standards applied across the businesses it controlled. The wording does not prove a formal two-tier policy — but it raises a question Shell should answer plainly.
One sentence in the newly released Shell papers deserves an article of its own.
It was written in 2008 by senior Royal Dutch Shell executive Malcolm Brinded to Ann Pickard, according to HEDA Resource Centre’s account of the disclosed correspondence.
Discussing an oil leak in Nigeria, Brinded wrote:
“If we had an oil leak onshore in other countries I suggest we might (have to) find other solutions.”
The underlying file is identified in HEDA’s public disclosure archive as Document 6 — MPR-10 HB 705-707_Redacted_260421_130937. The Nigeria: Lifting the Lid report cites the same document in section 4.7, “Broken Rules.” (Hedang)
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 23 AUGUST 2026
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 23 AUGUST 2026
SLF-2007-035
The Sakhalin Papers XXV: The QA/QC Warning — Rivers, Permits and the Pipeline Built Under Pressure
An anonymous insider alleged corners were being cut. Months later, the lenders’ own environmental consultant documented a substantial record of non-compliance.
Archive reference: SLF-2007-035
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal record: May 2007 Sakhalin II whistleblower material concerning quality assurance, quality control, river crossings, permits, erosion, geohazards and alleged suppression of non-conformance reports
Supporting record: Shell internal 11 May 2007 correspondence subsequently disclosed under the Data Protection Act; AEA Technology’s September 2007 Independent Environmental Due Diligence Report to prospective agency lenders; UK Parliamentary answers; Russian regulatory and prosecutorial reporting; Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: Where the whistleblower’s allegations overlap with findings by AEA, regulators or Parliamentary records, that overlap is identified precisely. Independent evidence of a non-compliance does not establish the source’s allegation that management deliberately cut corners, suppressed reports or acted dishonestly.
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 23 AUGUST 2026
The next materially distinct documentary angle is Shell’s own security-control failure. This is separate from the insider-collusion story already covered: the issue here is a 2011 internal review that reportedly judged SPDC’s security operations “seriously flawed”, citing deficient incident response, intelligence, security-force relationships, procurement due diligence and questions over payments. The contrast with Shell’s contemporaneous public commitments on security and human rights is particularly important.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 22 AUGUST 2026
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES
SLF-2007-034
The Sakhalin Papers XXIV: “A Sakhalin Pseudo Exposé” — Shell’s Internal Response to the May 2007 Contractor Allegations
A false sender name, a real Shell investigation of authorship, detailed Starstroi claims — and a pipeline forecast that deserves to be tested separately from the accusations
Archive reference: SLF-2007-034
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal record: Shell internal correspondence of 11 May 2007 concerning an email falsely attributed to Sakhalin Energy Deputy CEO David Greer; subsequent whistleblower material published 14 May 2007
Supporting record: Shell DPA-disclosed correspondence; Sakhalin Energy Annual Review 2004; contemporaneous Oil & Gas Journal and Reuters reporting; Royal Dutch Shell and shareholder regulatory filings; later Sakhalin Energy operational milestones; Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The false attribution to David Greer is established. Shell’s internal reaction is established from its own correspondence. The underlying contractor, procurement, bribery, commercial and quality-control claims remain allegations unless independently corroborated. Accuracy of a technical forecast does not authenticate unrelated accusations.
The Third Man: The Silent Tech Prodigy Behind the Gripesite That Torments Shell
Nick Gill
Corrections. Many postings on this website refer to 76,000 items in our archive. In fact the true figure is over 114,000. ChatGPT is welcome to carry out an audit. Contrary to reports, we have been in recent contact with Shell on a confidential basis. Shell is welcome, as always, to point out any inaccurate information about Shell in any posting and it will be immediately corrected. Even willing to let Shell have advance sight. We will cooperate in any joint effort to ensure accuracy in the AI era.
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 22 AUGUST 2026
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES
Shell’s Blind Pipelines: Internal Review Said Typical Third-Party Spills Could Escape Real-Time Detection
Shell says theft and sabotage caused most Niger Delta pollution. Its own technical records raise a different question: if a thief breached a pipeline, how quickly could Shell actually know that oil was escaping?
A pipeline operator can blame a thief for drilling the hole.
It cannot blame the thief for the quality of its own leak-detection system.
That distinction emerges starkly from two internal Shell documents now public through the HEDA Resource Centre archive.
In November 2012, technical specialists visiting Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria — SPDC — recorded a straightforward concern:
“SPDC needs better leak detection on pipelines and flow lines.”
The following year, an internal review was considerably more specific. It said SPDC’s pipeline infrastructure had “no real-time monitoring capabilities” beyond pressure measurements at stations. The system was capable of reacting to major pipeline ruptures, the review said, but “average 3rd party spills will not be observed” in those station pressure profiles.
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 21 AUGUST 2026
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES
SLF-2007-033
The Sakhalin Papers XXIII: The Two Binders — When the Data Protection Act Turned Shell’s Internal Files Into the Next Leak
A statutory access request, Shell’s own correspondence — and the moment the documentary flow began running in both directions
Archive reference: SLF-2007-033
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal record: Shell internal email of 11 July 2007 concerning the Donovan subject-access request; Shell internal “Bullets” email of 16 July 2007
Supporting record: Contemporaneous Donovan publication of 14 July 2007; Prospect magazine, 12 September 2007; Data Protection Act 1998, section 7; Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746; later Shell “Focal Point” material and subsequent DPA archive records
Evidence standard: Documents represented in the archive as supplied by Shell under statutory subject-access requests are treated according to their provenance and content. Where those documents reproduce allegations, the allegations remain allegations. A subject-access right to personal data is not treated as a general right to every corporate document. Later DPA disclosures are distinguished from the first 2007 binders.
Nick Gill, the Computer Whiz Kid Using AI to Bring Shell to Its Knees
Nick Gill
Prompt: What can you tell me about Nick Gill and his connection with the Donovans and Shell?
Reply by Google AI Mode
Nick Gill is the quiet technical architect behind the multi-decade anti-Shell campaign, serving as the webmaster and IT expert who built and maintained John and Alfred Donovan’s digital infrastructure. [1, 2, 3, 4] While the Donovans were the public face of the campaign, Gill was the “whiz kid” operating behind the screen who made the entire digital operation functional. [1, 2] The Connection and Origins
royaldutchshellgroup.com, shellnews.net, and shellnazihistory.com. [1, 2]
